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ABSTRACT
The strategic and critical materials stockpiles of the United States
have been developed and employed as a national security measure since
they were established in 1946. The program for stockpiling has been be-
set by inefficient organization
,
stringent control and partisan politics
since its beginning. Attempts to correct stockpile problems have been
sporadic and generally ineffective. Because of the changing concept of
warfare which has made stockpiling of raw materials relatively obsolete,
a new and radical approach to revision of the stockpiling program is re-
quired The cost of maintaining $9 billion of stockpile assets is in-
creasing and is an additional reason for revision
.
This study traces the
evolution of stockpiling, discusses principles, objectives and problems
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PREFACE
During the last decade or so the development and accumulation of
nuclear weapons
,
first by the United States , and then by the Soviet Union,
have revolutionized the problems of national security more rapidly than
ever before in our history. No comparable technological revolution in
weaponry has ever been quite like it. The analogy of gunpowder is fre-
quently cited, but the substitution of gunpowder took place gradually over
a period of centuries; and, like the weapons it replaced, gunpowder was
used almost exclusively in a circumscribed area called the battlefield.
Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, a few years after their invention,
have made it possible, indeed cheap and easy, to destroy entire popu-
lations and economies . Such profound consequences influence the charac-
ter of security that is desired for our country, as well as the policies used
to achieve it. Today, or next year, or within any time span, one nation
can unilaterally destroy another. Under such circumstances, problems that
once dominated our strategy for defense have become obsolete . Fresh and
imaginative thought is needed to portray accurately the needs of our country
in the years ahead for security and the survival that it entails
.
It was with these thoughts in mind that I selected from among many
programs concerned with our national security the stockpiles of strategic
and critical materials for analysis in this paper . It was selected, not be-
cause I believe it to be the most important, but because it represents much
outmoded thinking that has been and is being applied to many Government
programs, and it is one for which a measure of fresh thought is long overdue
My purpose in this paper is to draw a thread of organization through
the elements of the stockpiling program in order to present them in concert
11

with proposed changes It is believed that these will give new mean-
ing and direction to stockpiling goals and concepts. Hopefully, this
effort may prove useful in ways that 1 have not imagined.
I am indebted to Professor H. Arthur Hoverland of the Manage-
ment School faculty for his assistance and thoughtful recommendations
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INTRODUCTION
The great industrialist, Andrew Carnegie, once said, "Surplus
wealth is a sacred trust which its possessor is bound to administer in
his lifetime for the good of the community."
He was not talking about the nation's stockpiles of strategic and
critical materials, but the analogy is quite appropriate . The possessor
in this case is the Government of the United States. The surplus wealth
involved is the immense pile of materials currently in the stockpile. Our
Government has a sacred trust to administer these assets for the good of
the American public and for the security of the nation.
Stockpiles are national assets, or wealth, in the sense that much
good can be extracted from their use in an effective stockpiling policy
that is in harmony with the strategic thinking of the times . The original
concept under which the stockpiling program was born has for all practical
purposes been replaced by more realistic evaluations of the types of war
that this country may be called upon to wage. The time required to mobi-
lize and press into being superior forces as has been done in the past no
longer exists. Wars will be fought with what is available at the time of
attack as in the case of nuclear war, or they will be limited in nature to
the extent that normal sources of materials from overseas locations would
very likely still be available.
The logical follow-up to such recognition is to develop with as much
foresight as can be commanded a stockpiling policy that will perpetuate
Edward A, McDermott, " An Open Letter on Stockpiling"
,
Reprint
from Mining Congress Journal
,




the assets of the stockpile in such a manner as to remove them from their
role as cost generating dregs upon the taxpayer's pocketbook, In so do-
ing, such a policy should actively promote the utilization of stockpile
assets in a variety of programs that will, in the end analysis, provide
the greatest measure of good for the American public.
It is with such thoughts in mind that this paper will examine the
present policy for stockpiling and offer certain recommendations for
needed improvement „ It is not inferred that the solutions for the problems
to be presented herein are the best ones available. The point that should
be recognized, however, is that a new and probably radical approach is
required to put stockpiling on a paying basis, What's more, such an ap-
proach is needed soon, before the problem grows so large that it precludes
any painless means for its solution.
If this paper serves no more than to stimulate thought on the part of
those more qualified to deal directly with the problems of our national





THE STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL METERIALS STOCKPILES
For many years a difference of opinion has existed about the rela-
tive effectiveness, or usefulness , of the Strategic and Critical Mate-
rials Stockpiles of the United States . Arguments over the need for such
a stockpile have been loud and strong with proponents ranging from strong
supporters of the program, such as domestic mining interests, to equally
vehement opposition to this concept, such as modern strategists evalu-
ating the defense requirements of our nation. Somewhere in between
these extremes of position is the answer to what purpose stockpiling
serves, now and for the future, and how such a purpose is to be achieved.
The facts that bear on this argument must be considered logically to gener-
ate an overall solution for adapting the stockpile to present day require-
ments o
In presenting the material in this paper / only one definition is
needed for the proper understanding of the term. Stockpile , or stockpiling
,
is used frequently and the term refers to the four major stockpiles of stra-
tegic and critical materials owned by the Government . Reference to any
one individual stockpile is by name only„
The Philosophy of Stockpiling
Stockpiling has been described as a national insurance policy de-
signed to cover the risk of serious or extreme shortages of basic raw ma-
terials during periods of national crisis , such as wan

The stockpile is not designed or expected to break all materials
bottlenecks, to solve all production problems, to stabilize minerals
and agricultural commodities markets or to maintain marginal and
sub-marginal mines in production in periods of falling demand. It
is strictly a national security measure.*
This statement more than any other reflects the basic thinking
which guided policy makers in their approach to stockpiling in the early
years of its manipulation
.
Stockpiling has also been likened to a gigantic banking operation,
performing four different theoretical banking services. The first is that
of a safe deposit vault. Stocks of materials are maintained under safe-
keeping. Withdrawals of some stocks in the stockpile, similar to long-
term investments , are to be made only as a last resort in the event of
national emergency. The second service is that of a savings account.
Stocks are withdrawn to meet military needs over and above the output avail-
able at a given time, but steps are taken to increase production or reduce
consumption to enable the eventual replacement of stocks withdrawn. A
third service is similar to a checking account used to balance day-by-day
additions or deductions from supplies on hand. The fourth service provides
a convenient cash or till reserve from which small quantities can be drawn
2
to meet unexpected shortages in particular industries or plants.
Department of Defense, The Munitions Board, Stockpile Report to
the Congress
, July 23, 1951, Washington, D.C., p. 6.
2
Jules Backman, Antonin Basch, Solomon Fabricant, Martin R. Gains-
brugh, and Emanuel Stein, War and Defense Economics, Rinehard and Co.
,
Inc., New York, 1952, pp. 133-134,

Purpose and Scope
Early thinking with regard to the purpose and scope of stockpiling
is seen in the following excerpt from the Strategic and Critical Materials
Stock Piling Act of 1946, the legislative forefather of our present stock-
piling program:
That the natural resources of the United States in certain strategic
and critical materials being deficient or insufficiently developed to
supply the industrial, military and naval needs of the country for
common defense, it is the policy of the Congress and the purpose
and intent of this act to provide for the acquisition and retention
of stocks of these materials and to encourage the conservation
and development of these materials within the United States, and
thereby decrease and prevent wherever possible a dangerous and
costly dependence of the United States upon foreign nations for sup-
plies of these materials in times of national emergency,
In order to effectuate the policy and purpose expressed above,
this Act provides for the following:
1. Determination by the Government of those materials that are
strategic and critical under the provisions of the Act as well as the
quantities and quality to be stockpiled.
2 . Industries concerned with stockpile materials were to par-
ticipate in advisory committees to advise the Government with respect
to purchase, sale, care, handling, etc. , of stockpile materials.
3. Establishment of a reasonable time period (not over 1 year)
to allow for production and delivery from domestic sources of mat-
erials for the stockpile,
4. The Government is to be responsible for:
a. Storage, security, and maintenance of the stockpile on
military and naval installations , and other locations
.
3
Public Law No. 520, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, July 23, 1946,
Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act .

b. Necessary refining and/or processing to convert raw
materials into suitable forms for stockpiling „
c. Rotation of materials in the stockpile as necessary to
prevent deterioration and obsolescence.
d. Necessary disposals as the result of redeterminations
.
5. A semiannual report to Congress on stockpile activities.
6. A release policy for materials in the stockpile:
a
. On order of the President at any time when in his judg-
ment these materials are required for defense purposes.
b. In time of war or national emergency by order of an
agency designated by the President.
7 . Receipt into the stockpile of surplus materials owned by
other Government agencies if they are strategic or critical materials
without charge to stockpile funds.
8 . Investigations by the Secretaries of Agriculture and the In-
terior into resources, production, and utilization to increase
reliance upon domestic rather than foreign produced strategic and
critical materials. ^
Thus the stockpiling program was designed to provide through
advance storage for foreseeable deficits of various raw materials that were
generally not available within the borders of the United States in sufficient
quantity to meet essential wartime needs . The scope of the program in-
cluded calling attention to opportunities for the conservation and develop-




Executive Office of the President, Office of Defense Mobilization,
Office of Assistant Director of Materials , Outline of General Policy for
Planning and Operation of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpile,
March 8, 1954, letter signed by E. H. Weaver.

Stockpiling Objectives
The primary objective of stockpiling has been purported to be the
reduction of the Nation's dangerous and costly dependence in time of war
upon sources of essential raw materials from outside the borders of the
United States. In support of this objective it has been necessary to ac-
cumulate a sufficient reserve of these vital materials to make up the
deficit between probable requirements and estimated availabilities of sup-
plies of materials that would be needed during any future conflict. It seeks
to create a reserve of materials of a strategic or critical nature sufficient
to meet the wartime needs of the country between the outbreak of hostil-
ities and such time as may be required to expand domestic production to
meet wartime needs, develop new sources of supply, or reestablish dis-
rupted lines of supply from foreign sources.
A second objective of stockpiling was the development of new domestic
sources of strategic and critical materials, as well as the development of
substitute and alternate materials. Programs have been in operation for years
for development of substitute materials, for more effective use of existing
raw materials, and for analysis of requirements for new and different ma-
terials in the development of weapons systems for the military services. Such
programs have proved to be relatively successful, although there have never
been any concerted Government programs in this area that were brought out
during this study.
Industrial College of the Armed Forces, The Economics of National
Security , Vol. VI, Washington, D.C., 1956, p. 76.
c
Jules Backman, _op. cit.
, p. 134.

Legislative Authority for Stockpiling
The stockpiling program for strategic and critical materials exists
under the following statutes. These laws are discussed in more detail
in Chapter II.
1 . The Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (Public
Law No. 520, 79th Congress amending Public Law No. 117 of June 7 , 1939)
2 . The Defense Production Act of 19 50 , as amended (Public Law No.
774, 81st Congress) .
3. The Domestic Minerals Program Extension Act of 1953 (Public Law
No. 206, 83rd Congress) .
4. The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954
as amended (Public Law No. 480, 83rd Congress) .
5. The Domestic Tungsten, Asbestos, Fluorspar and Columbium-
Tantalum Production and Purchase Act of 1956 (Public Law No. 733, 84th
Congress) .
6. The Agricultural Act of 1956 (Public Law No. 540, 84th Congress) J
Composition and Value of the Stockpile
As of December 31, 1963, the stockpile of strategic and critical ma-
o
terials inventory consisted of 52.1 million short tons of materials accumu-
lated in four separate stockpiles by the statutes listed in the preceding sec-
tion!^ The four stockpiles are:
7
Office of Emergency Planning, Stockpile Report to the Congress,
January-June 1963, Washington, D.C., p. vi.
o
General Services Administration, Statistical Supplement Stockpile
Report to the Congress
,




1. The National Stockpile; 2. The Defense Production Act Stockpile;
3. The Supplemental Stockpile; and 4. The Commodity Credit Corpora-
tion Stockpile. ^
Except for some materials transferred from other inventories, all
of those in the National Stockpile were acquired by authority of the Stra-
tegic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act of 1946. All materials in the
Defense Production Act Stockpile were acquired through the Act of the same
name passed in 1950. Material in the Supplemental Stockpile was obtained
under the barter features of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assist-
ance Act of 1954 where the accumulation of stockpile materials was merely
a by-product of an act designed to disburse a portion of the huge agricul-
tural stockpile of food commodities. The fourth stockpile, the CCC Stock-
pile
,
is an inventory of items being held by the Commodity Credit Corporation
awaiting transfer to the Supplemental Stockpile if no other Government agency
wishes to buy or use them
,
As of December 31, 1963, the stockpile was valued at $8,673,879,400
(this figure includes $80 million worth of material on order) at acquisition
cost. The value of this material at estimated market price was listed as
$7,671,716,700. Of the former total $5,756,516,100 at cost was in the
National Stockpile; $1,483,573,500 was in the Defense Production Act Stock-
pile; $23,675,400 was in the CCC Stockpile; and $1,329,119,600 was in the
Supplemental Stockpile.
The value of materials in the stockpile inventories is in some in-
stances only an estimate of what might be received from the sale of a
9
Office of Emergency Planning, Strategic and Critical Materials
Descriptive Data
,
March 31, 1963, Washington, D.C., p. ii.
Ibid.

specific stockpile material at any given time. Even in the case of items
having published market values the price is subject to fluctuation in the
market. Therefore, any value placed upon the stockpile must be accepted
with certain reservations. Disposal of many materials would in all proba-
bility shrink their stockpile value thus increasing any loss the Government
might sustain as the result of market price variances
.
Many stockpile materials are traded actively each day in the com-
modity markets of the country and the world. They have a pegged daily
market value which varies with conditions that affect the market. Almost
all items of principal importance in the stockpile fit this category. Market
variations are subject to many influences among which are the effects of
large scale commodity dumping. Rumor of large sales have almost the same
effect on the market as do actual dumping operations. So, it is only by
acceptance of the theory of the going concern that a stockpile value can be
pegged at the price indicated in the commodity market. To abandon the
stockpile entirely and try mass disposal of these vast amounts of materials
would be the equivalent of a major catastrophe to many nations.
Stockpile Administration
As of June 30 , 1963, the entire stockpile inventory was stored at
165 different locations throughout the country as follows:
1. Military depots 52 locations
2. General Services Adm„ depots ^ 4
3. Other Gov't, owned sites 10
4. Industrial plant sites 39
5. Leased commercial sites 16
6. Commercial warehouses 24
11
11
Stockpile Report to the Congress, January-June 1963, 0£. cit ., p„ 10

The exact locations of stockpile inventories is "need to know"
information and is not available to the public, an indication that the
secrecy question to be discussed later in this paper has still not been
resolved.
The cumulative storage and maintenance costs for materials stored
at these facilities since the passage of the 1946 stockpile act totals
13$375,260,061 for the items in the National Stockpile, alone. ' These
costs include facilities construction, storage and handling, and net rota-
tion charges over the life of the program. For the six months ending Decem-
14
ber 31, 19 63, maintenance costs had totaled almost $6 million. Over the
past four years, in fact, these costs averages 12 million dollars per year.
Storage sites are distributed throughout the country to avoid excessive
damage in the event of military attack . Since location of these sites is
considered to be important to the national security it is often cited as a
reason for classifying this information and withholding it from the American
public. Many of these sites are on military installations where rent is paid
to the military service to whom the site belongs for use of storage spaces
and facilities. In other instances these materia
property rented from the owners for this purpose.
rials are stored on private
12
Letter from W.N, Lawrence, Office of Emergency Planning, to
LCDR D. B. Gordon, February 4, 19 64
13





The service provided by a military installation in return for rental
fees paid by the General Services Administration for stockpile storage and
maintenance is described in an article in the January, 1962, issue of the
Monthly Newsletter, Magazine of the Navy Supply Corps , entitled
"Stockpiling Critical Material" byLT, R. H. Nace.

A number of important materials in the stockpile are held in the
form of raw ore, concentrates, and upgraded material,, Usually, these
items are maintained in large quantities piled in the open where they are
subject to the effects of the weather. Most raw ores and early forms of
upgraded material can be stored in the open without noticeable loss from
erosion, deterioration, or contamination. Significantly, some piles of
raw ores and concentrates have been maintained in open storage since
their acquisition in 1946,
There is one other item of expense that is often overlooked when
there is published discussion of stockpiling costs . This item deals with
interest charged for money used to purchase the stockpile. It is not a
precisely accurate calculation to figure exactly how much money has been
paid out as interest by the Government, but Kent H. Crowther, a super-
visory accountant for the General Accounting Office, was able to produce
a fairly reasonable computation using an average interest rate for money
spent on the program over the years of its existence. This average was
determined to be 3,825 percent. At this average rate of interest it costs
the taypayers $300 million each year to retain their present investment in
17
the stockpiles of this country.
Stockpile Management
Responsibility for management of the stockpiling program has been
delegated by the President of the United States to the Director of the
U. S. Cong., Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Stock-
pile and Naval Petroleum Reserves Subcommittee, Inquiry Into the Strategic
and Critical Material Stockpiles of the U.S. , Draft Report, Government







Office of Emergency Planning, an agency within the Executive Office
of the President. Plans and policies adopted for stockpile management
are developed in concert with other executive agencies and departments
having more than a passing interest in the activities of stockpiling. The
principal policy recommending body is the Interdepartmental Materials Ad-
visory Committee, a sort of board of directors. This committee is com-
posed of representatives from the Departments of Defense, State, Agri-
culture, Commerce, and the Interior, the General Services Administration,
Administration for Internal Development, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, and observers from the Bureau of the Budget, the
Atomic Energy Commission, and the Small Business Administration. IMAC
18
is chaired by the Director of OEP.
OEP develops policies with reference to (1) what materials are deemed
to be strategic and critical; (2) the quality of the materials to be acquired;
and (3) the quantities . To establish procurement goals for each kind of
material stockpiled, OEP computes and establishes stockage objectives.
These objectives constitute the quantity of each material required for the
stockpile to satisfy strategic need. This phase of stockpiling will be dis-
cussed further along in the paper.
Under the terms of the Defense Production Act, the Office of Emer-
gency Planning has the responsibility to determine policy to increase the
productive capacity of the nation in terms of certain raw materials to the
point where the immediate needs of the United States can be met domesti-
cally in the event of national crisis . This is sometimes referred to as
18
U.S. Cong., Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National
Stockpile and Naval Petroleum Reserves Subcommittee, Inquiry Into the
Strategic and Critical Material Stockpiles of the U.S . , Part I, Government
Printing Office, Washington, D. C, 1963, p. 1,
11

helping to establish a mobilization base,, It is OEP's responsibility
to determine when a program of expansion for any given material should
be established.
From the start of the stockpiling program the General Services Admin-
istration has held responsibility for purchasing materials required to meet
OEP's stockage objectives. Each year, after passage of appropriations
acts authorizing procurement of stockpile materials, OEP issues a general
directive to the General Services Administration designating materials to
be purchased toward current stockage objectives. GSA, also, negotiates
contracts for expansion of production facilities desired under Defense Pro-
duction Act authority. GSA has additional responsibilities for maintenance ,
storage, and care of the stockpile inventories as was previously mentioned.
Congress has given the Government express statutory authority to
acquire strategic and critical materials by bartering surplus agricultural
products. The Department of Agriculture has primary responsibility for
administering this program. Almost 90% of the materials now in the Supple-
mental Stockpile were acquired under Section 303 of the Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act. The Commodity Credit Corporation, a
Federal corporation operated by the Department of Agriculture, acts as the
Government intermediary in the conduct of barter transactions . All stock-
pile type materials acquired in exchange for agricultural surpluses are ob-
tained at market prices , and the General Services Administration acts as
the advisory agency in these cases. The Supplemental Stockpile is
administered primarily by the Department of Agriculture. A committee
known as the Supplemental Stockpile Advisory Committee for Barter assists
the Secretary of Agriculture in determining what materials are best to take
19
under the Barter authority. Thus, it is seen that a third agency of the
19
Inquiry, Part I, op_. cit.




Government is involved to a significant degree in the management of
the stockpiling program
.
And finally, Congress has much to say concerning what materials
go in and out of the stockpile since it maintains a legislative watch over
what transpires in the management of the program. Annual requests for
appropriations to finance new stockpile purchases and maintenance costs
provide much leverage through which Congress can make a considerable
impression as to its desires for the stockpile.
Stockpile management is for all practical purposes a multi-managed
affair with the Office of Emergency Planning trying to tie together some-





THE HISTORY OF STOCKPILING IN THE U.S.
In both World Wars I and II, and again in the Korean conflict, the
provision of adequate supplies of basic raw materials was a prime objec-
tive of national policy. Each emergency found the nation basically un-
prepared. In 1917, months before Congress declared war, political and
business leaders were stressing the need for preparedness, but neither in
the War Department or elsewhere in the Government was there any definite
plan for economic mobilization. The initial impulse for planning the ef-
fective use of manpower and resources came from men in private life. At
first, the Government tried to introduce economic controls through per-
suasion, relying on the voluntary cooperation of the business community.
It was not until six months after the declaration of war that compulsory
control of exports and imports of raw materials was established, and almost
a year before the control of priorities and price fixing was concentrated in
the War Industries Board.
As early as 1921 officers in the Departments of War and the Navy had
discussed the need for a stockpiling program to establish economic independ-
ence in time of war, This thinking is well described in the following review
by the Munitions Board of that day:
Shortages of materials in World War I upset production schedules and
delayed essential programs. Thenceforth, the General Staff took increas-
ing account of materials requirements in its planning; a consolidated tabu-
lation of 42 materials, known as the Harbord List, was drawn up in 1921
Percy W. Bidwell, Raw Materials
,




as a fundamental criterion in determining the feasibility of
military requirements. Subsequently the task of studying
materials passed to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
War and then to the Army and Navy Munitions Board. The
studies progressively broadened in scope to include con-
structive programs and policies to expand materials resources,
to improve the availability of materials from outside the United
States, and to solve specific wartime shortage problems.
^
The Harbord List, together with the Army and Navy Munitions Board
List of 17 strategic materials in 1939, is shown on Table I, page 16.
The first official step toward stockpiling was taken by the Navy in
19 38 when Congress granted an appropriation of $3 . 5 million to accumulate
reserves of strategic materials. The Stockpiling Act of June 7, 1939, gave
legislative authority for an authorized expenditure of $100 million for stock-
piling purposes. This was actually the beginning of our current stockpil-
ing program. The Procurement Division of the Treasury Department was
authorized to begin the accumulation of stockpiles over a four -year period.
The need for broader authority and larger expenditures became increasingly
obvious as World War II began in Europe. On July 25, 1940, the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation was given broad powers to produce, acquire,
and transport materials for defense. As the result of wartime controls and
mass expenditures the U.S. emerged from World War II with a stockpile
3
balance of some $500 million.
The Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act of 19 46, an
amended version of the 1939 act, firmly established the stockpiling concept
2
Department of Defense, the Munitions Board, Stockpile Report to
the Congress
,
January 23, 1950, Washington, D. C, p. 16.
3

































































Source: Stockpile Report to the Congress (Washington: The Munitions
Board, January 23, 19 50), p. 18.
16

as a permanent feature of American security measures. The 1946 act
called for accumulation of $2 billion of material over a five-year period.
Commodities were to be selected for stockpiling only after an intensive
review which determined (1) that they were essential for defense, (2) that
in wartime a serious deficit would exist between supply and demand, and
(3) that stockpiling was the most practical and efficient means of meeting
the deficit.
4
At first, the stockpile grew so slowly that in January, 1949, the
Hoover Commission reported its condition to be deplorable and made the
following observations:
The Committee wishes particularly to emphasize that in one
critical aspect of industrial and mobilization planning, divided
responsibility is leading to serious results. The condition of
the stockpile is deplorable. While there have doubtless been
many reasons for this, including limited appropriations in the
past and restrictions on purchases which conflicted with civil-
ian demands, an obvious, basic reason lies in the fact that
there Is no single, centralized responsibility and direction of
stock piling and stock piling policy anywhere within the
Government. Both by statute and by Executive Order, responsi-
bility is diffused among the National Security Resources Board,
the Munitions Board, the Treasury, and various other executive
departments, This should be remedied at once.
These words, for all practical purposes, are true today, fifteen
years after the Hoover Commission reports.
Much of the difficulty was not organizational, however. The Muni-
tions Board had proceeded cautiously with procurement plans for fear of
4
Percy Bidwell, op. cit.
,
p. 40.
The Committee on the National Security Organisation, Task Fore*
Report on National Security Organ ization (Appendix G)
,
prepared for the
Commliiion on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government,
January, 1949, p. 92.
17

depriving civilian industries of much needed materials for postwar re-
conversion and retooling. Congress, furthermore, had been reluctant
to appropriate funds for carrying out its stockpiling wishes . Between
1946 and 19 50 only half of the money needed for the five-year program
authorized was provided.
However, the program received new impetus with the outbreak of
hostilities in Korea and the Defense Production Act was enacted in 1950.
This act made $3.8 billion in new money available for stockpiling pur-
poses in the 18 months between July, 1950, and December, 1951, when it
became evident that procurement of materials on a gradual basis was not
sufficient to meet rapidly expanding needs . As requirements grew larger
and more complex, it became evident that an in-house capability was de-
sirable for producing any raw material that was remotely available within
the nation's borders. This led to enactment of the Defense Production Act.
Its main objective was to provide an incentive, where possible, for indus-
tries to enlarge their production facilities for critically needed items . Loans
and guarantees were given to private business to expand capacity and ex-
plore
,
develop and mine essential materials. The Government provided
protection by agreeing to buy up any surplus production in the event such
happened. And it did; the result was the Defense Production Act Stockpile.
One other agency to which Congress gave stockpiling responsi-
bilities was the Economic Cooperation Administration. In 1948 this organi-
zation was authorized to use 5% of counterpart funds available in Marshall
Plan countries to purchase strategic and critical materials. This procedure,
however, made such inroads into available post-war free world supplies
that bitter complaints were aroused from European countries in the throes
of economic recovery and reconstruction. The same lack of concentrated
Office of Emergency Planning, Remarks by Edward A . McDermott,
Director
,
Office of Emergency Planning
,
Press Release, August 13, 1963,
Washington, D. C, p. 4.
18

responsibility that the Hoover Commission noted for the national stock
-
7
piling program was evident in the purchasing activities of ECA.
The end of the Korean War did not bring a settled peace as the
two major powers, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. , settled into the cold
war. The nation was well aware of the need, by now, for adequate
preparedness which included an adequate stockpile of strategic and
critical materials . Western mining interests , suffering from the post-
Korean slump in prices and demand, pressed Congress to increase its ap-
propriations for stockpiling. The era in which politics used the stockpile
for a pressure group yo-yo had begun.
In 1953-54 a Congressional investigation of the stockpile situation
was launched. The investigation uncovered almost incredible confusion
in the administration of the program. Some fifty-four different boards and
agencies of the Executive Department were involved in some ways . In ad-
dition, the investigation uncovered the fact that five major interdepartmental
committees and ten international groups were all concerned with stockpiling .«
However, little resulted in the way of improvement over stockpile manage-
ment in spite of the detail of this investigation.
In October 1953, President Eisenhower appointed a Cabinet Com-
mittee on Minerals Policy to study the problems relating to production and
utilization of minerals and metals. The Committee's preliminary report
laid the foundation for a new, long-term, stockpiling program for minerals
and metals in particular. Under this program, the stockpile acquired ad-
ditional supplies of stockpiled materials primarily from domestic producers.
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o




Long-term stockage objectives, the new concept introduced by this
committee, went further in the direction of self-sufficiency by ignoring
all sources of supply outside the continental limits of the U.S. for
strategic and critical materials. The net effect was to double, in some
9
cases, total requirement for a given material for stockpiling purposes.
Disposal of farm surpluses was the next objective that Congress
attached to the stockpile program. The Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act in 19 54 developed a plan to use foreign currencies received
from the sale of surplus agricultural commodities to purchase strategic
and critical materials both in countries buying surplus food and in third
party nations. Under this authority barter transactions, as they were
termed, increased until in 19 56 they constituted the largest single source
of material for stockpiling. In Fiscal Year, 1956, the total value of all
strategic and critical materials acquired by barter for the Supplemental
Stockpile exceeded $10 5 million. Original enthusiasm for this method
of paring farm surpluses cooled somewhat, however, when Congress learned
that barter deals were taking the place of cash sales at better prices.
Under the pressure of mounting criticism in 1957 as to the strategic
value of the stockpile, Gordon Gray, then Director of the Office of Defense
Mobilization, assigned to an advisory committee composed of distinguished
private citizens the task of reexamination of stockpiling policy. This com-
mittee published a report that covered several points considered to be repre-
sentative of the problems faced in management of the stockpile at that point
in time. These included:
1. Problems associated with upgrading materials.
2. The difficulty concerned with declassification of information











3. Methods involved with selection of materials to be stockpiled.
4. Questions concerning the effect of stockpiling upon the na-
tional economy.
5. Problems concerned with stockpile modification to prepare for
the possibility of nuclear attack.
6. Possibilities of stockpile adaptation to the Civil Defense effort.
7 . Recognition of facts concerning advances in military strategy
and logistics that had changed the need for many common industrial
materials
.
8 . Criticism of the fact that stockpiling had prepared the country
for the last war.
9. Problems concerned with disposition of excesses.
10 . Criticism of the diversion of stockpiling from its original pur-
pose in an attempt to regulate the economy.
11. A blunt endorsement of stockpiling for national defense, only.
12. An endorsement of the food for materials barter program.
None of the recommendations offered by this committee were immedi-
ately adopted. Many have never been adopted. The stockage objective
was reduced as recommended from a 5 year war basis to a 3 year war basis
by Defense Mobilization Order V-7 of June 14, 19 58. It directed that "all
strategic stockpile objectives shall be limited to meeting estimated short-
„
12
ages of materials for a 3 year emergency period.
Things remained relatively dormant with regard to stockpile publicity
until President Kennedy, on January 31, 19 62
,
pried the lid off the problem
when he announced at a news conference that he was "astonished to find
that the stockpiling program had accumulated $7.7 billion worth of materials,
U.S. Special Stockpile Advisory Committee, Stockpiling for Defense
in the Nuclear Age
,
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. , 19 58,
pp. 9-12.
12
Office of Defense Mobilization, Defense Mobilization Order V-7,
Federal Register, June 14, 1958, p. 4333.
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an amount that exceeds our emergency requirements as presently deter-
mined by $3.4 billion." He went on to say "the government has ac-
quired more than seven times the amount that could possibly be used."
On February 23, 1962, an investigation was launched by the Senate Sub-
committee on the National Stockpile and Naval Petroleum Reserves under
the chairmanship of Senator Symington of Missouri. After many witnesses
,
63 meetings (formal) and hearings, and 3,900 pages of printed record, the
investigation was concluded and 18 recommendations were presented sum-
marized as follows:
1. All inventories of strategic and critical materials should be
acquired, handled and disposed of by uniform methods. Two stockpiles
should exist; one including all materials up to the stockage objective;
and two, all quantities in excess of these objectives.
2. Long-range disposal plans should be developed. Time required
for delay between sale request and Congressional approval should be
reduced to 60 days
.
3. Only the President should be permitted to dispose of materials
in the main, or number one, stockpile, and then only for national
defense.
4. The objectives and operations of the stockpile should be unclass-
ified and be considered as public knowledge.
5. The development of synthetics that will replace stockpile items
that can be quickly produced from domestically plentiful materials
should be recognized and encouraged.
6. The Interdepartmental Materials Advisory Committee should be
abolished and consultation with the Office of Emergency Planning inso-
far as stockpile management is concerned should be on an advisory
basis where other departments and agencies have an interest.
13 New York Times , February 1 , 19 62, p. 1, col. 6
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7. The barter of agricultural surpluses for strategic and criti-
cal materials should be stopped since an oversupply of any commodity
such as would be acquired tends to depress domestic prices when held
in the stockpile.
8. Stockpile funds should not be used to raise or support the
market price of any commodity.
9. Surplus stockpile materials should be used wherever possible
to discharge U.S. commitments under foreign aid and defense contracts.
10. Materials in the present stockpile are not suitable for rehab-
ilitation under a post-nuclear attack plan.
11. A feasible program for survival after nuclear attack using exist-
ing stockpiled materials should be evolved.
The investigation uncovered many instances where there were ap-
parent windfall profits from the sale of materials to the Government for
stockpiling purposes, and there was much criticism of the use of the stock-
pile for so-called private gain. However, there was the aura of partisan
politics involved in much of what came out of the hearings, thereby lessen-
ing to some degree the creditability of the study. Also, too much attention
was paid to what had been done, rather than engineering a conclusive search
for the answers to effective solutions to stockpiling ills.
Along with the Senate investigation, President Kennedy appointed the
Executive Stockpile Committee, en February 7, 19 62, to review the prin-
ciples and policies of stockpiling in the light of changing defense require-
ments and improved technology. This was a high-powered committee, indi-
cating the President's concern over the problem, consisting of the Director
of the Office of Emergency Planning, who was chairman, and the Secretaries
of State, Defense, Commerce, Labor and the Interior, the Director of the
14




Central Intelligence Agency, and the Administrator of General Services .
A series of recommendations were authored that paralleled those of the
Symington Subcommittee.
In addition, the Committee forwarded, on January 16, 1963, a report
to the president entitled Disposing of Excess Stockpile Materials in which
fourteen recommendations were offered, the most important of which was
a set of specific disposal plans. These plans specified five methods
of disposal which included sales for cash through normal commercial
channels; disposal by direct Government use such as in the U.S. Mint
for copper and nickel; indirect Government use by payments to Government
contractors in the form of stockpile materials for work performed; the use
of the barter medium where industry trades one type of goods produced for
stockpile items; and, the use of stockpile materials to pay for upgrading
requirements . Some of the recommendations have been put into effect by
the Office of Emergency Planning.
The latest activity of any consequence concerning the stockpile within
the Government was the introduction of a bill, S.2272, in the d8th Congress
,
1st Session, on October 31, 19 63, by Senator Symington. This bill calls for
enactment of a new stockpiling law to be called the "Materials Reserve and
Stockpile Act . " It would:
1. Provide guidelines for establishing stockage objectives.
2. Require all stockpiling contracts to be issued under the
terms of the Renegotiation Act of 1951.
3. Create a Materials Reserve Inventory which would be used as
a terminal stockpile through which excesses would be funneled to
areas where they would best serve the needs of the country.
Office of Emergency Planning, Press Release No . 88, Tuesday,
December 11 , 19 62, Washington, D.C., pp. 1-2.




Office of Emergency Planning
,
Press Release, August 13, 1963,
Washington, D.C., pp. 12-14.
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4. Reduce administrative lead time involved in the disposal of
excesses from the stockpile, and eliminate burdensome procedures
in the present stockpiling law.l?
This bill fails to develop a radically new approach to the problems
associated with stockpile management. It would cut some of the red-tape
involved with disposal action, but legislative control would still be an
inexorable restraint upon adapting the stockpile to the needs of the times .
As of this writing S.2272 has been reported favorably out of subcommittee
to the Senate Armed Services Committee,, Chances for passage of the bill
t ,. . .. 18are not optimistic.
17
IT. S. Cong. , Senate, Bill S.2272 , Materials Reserve and Stock -
piling Act
,
October 31, 19 63.
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A DISCUSSION OF PRINCIPLES
Peter F. Drucker, probably the most widely known and highly re-
spected industrial consultant and management authority of our time, wrote:
There is a great deal of talk today about creativity as the
source of innovation. The only dependable way to get innovation,
however, is to make sure that we get rid of the old, the outworn,
the no longer profitable or productive.
This quotation has particular application to the stockpiling program
as well as other areas of Government and business. Several principles
under which stockpiling exists will now be examined in the light of criti-
cism that has been and is being leveled at stockpile management.
Mobilization Base Principles
The principal objective of a program for materials availability in
the event of war must be to provide an adequate supply of materials essen-
tial to the war effort at the time and places needed. Such an objective
produces problems of transportation, reserves, and of processing into
forms for fabrication and consumption. Each of these is related to the
problem of establishing an adequate mobilization base designed to perform
the dual function of meeting needs in an emergency, and providing for normal
civilian demand plus military requirements on a level of national preparedness
There is nothing new in principle about the essentials of readiness
in raw materials. For many years military manpower has been managed on the
theory of having reserve forces behind active forces. So, too, with raw
Peter F. Drucker, "How to Be An Effective Executive," Nation's
Business , April, 19 61, p. 21.
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materials, ready reserves in both stockpiles and semi-processed goods
are retained in waiting to be added to the normal peacetime flow when the
situation requires such action. The same principle has been employed in
industry where standby plants, machines, tools, and production lines are
maintained in readiness.
Military mobilization means expansion of the armed forces
,
and the
term,, industrial mobilization, connotes production and labor force expan-
sion. Raw materials mobilization is part of industrial mobilization and in-
cludes extraordinary measures needed to expand production of vital ma-
terials . The companion principle to expansion of supply is restriction of
demand for less essential and nonessential uses. There is one additional
principle which might be called one of substitution and improvisation, where
women and children replace men in the factories and fields, and less scarce
goods, replace the scarce varieties.
Like all other security measures, those pertaining to raw materials
can be divided into preparedness measures which strengthen the mobili-
zation base, and emergency measures instituted in the time of national crisis
Stockpiling Principles
The contents of the Government stockpiles constitute readiness in
two ways. First, the means to satisfy the first surge of demand in an
emergency expansion of defense production when national conflict arrives
is provided. Secondly, these materials serve to supplement the flow of
production of stockpiled items until expansion of production catches up
with demand. The principle of stockpiling is no different than that of sav-
ing for a rainy day.
One eminent strategist noted that the further along in the process of




when an emergency strikes. This is noteworthy because it counters
contemporary thinking as to the form in which items should be
Stockpiling is essentially an operation to be conducted at times
other than during national emergencies. To be successful, it should be
completed prior to the onset of any war or crisis . Stockpiling should be
against specific requirements. This presents the difficult task of esti-
mating (1) what the overall requirement might be in the event of major
conflict, (2) what the likely flow of material production would be, and
(3) the resulting difference between (1) and (2) that gives the stockpile
requirement. It is apparent that such a stockpile will be based upon
national war plans and will be derived by calculating civilian and military
demand for a period covering the length of an estimated war.
The Shifting Character of Essentiality
The principle behind determination of materials as strategic or
critical must necessarily be flexible because of changing factors of sup-
ply and demand represented by each material in the stockpile. In addition,
the effect of technology must be considered. Rapid strides are being made
in the development and use of new materials that affect national strategy
and economic planning. This makes any listing of strategic and critical
materials subject to revision.
In addition, the raw materials' problems of the country in times of
war are not solely limited to those commodities supplied primarily or largely
from sources outside of the United States. The drain upon the domestic pro-
duction of materials is accelerated and these, too, frequently become critical
2
George A. Lincoln, Economics of National Security , Prentice-Hall,
Inc., Englewood Cliffs , N.J., 19 54, p. 189.
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even though they have not been stockpiled Raw materials for which
there is a surplus during peacetime can and often do become both stra-




The various laws under which stockpiling was established did not
specify which materials were to be stockpiled. They did not set goals or
limits on the amount of material to be included . If there is one charac-
teristic which is common to all statutes governing stockpiling, it is the
broad discretionary powers given to the executive branch of the Govern-
ment to carry out this program. With the exception of control over ap-
propriations and the disposal machinery for stockpile excesses, Congress
has seen fit to remove itself from stockpile control with regard to everyday
operations
.
The periods against which strategic and critical materials are to be
stockpiled are labeled as times of national emergency , an elusive term
whose definition has been left largely to interpretation by the executive.
Whatever Congress contemplated when the Stock Piling Act of 1946 was
passed, the language of the law does not limit national emergencies for
which stockpiling is authorized to times of war. The law is broad enough
to authorize stockpiling for periods of recovery following war, or even
periods of national emergency arising from cold war conditions or economic
causes if the executive so interprets .
Although it is evident from a review of the legislation that Congress
contemplated stockpiling primarily minerals and metals in the raw or semi-raw
3





state, the language of the law does not limit procurement for stockpiling
to these types of materials . The word materials has been defined to in-
clude semi-processed and manufactured items as well as materials other
than minerals or metals . It is left to the executive to determine in what
form materials will be carried when stockpiled.
Secrecy, Classification and the Need to Know
There is an inclination in Government circles to immediately classify
as secret, or higher, all matters that relate to the military posture of the
country, or to any element involved with national security. This policy
has not always been wise, necessary, or to the advantage of the American
public. The following excerpt is relevant:
The price of secrecy is not to be measured in terms of the irrat-
ionality of a policy product. One of the advantages to be gained
from a condition in which policy is determined through the interaction
of autonomous and competing elites is the opportunity to have rejected
alternatives brought up again and again for renewed consideration.
That the presence or absence of such opportunities can on occasion
have great consequences for the national security can be easily il-
lustrated by an incident in World War II. Hitler's decision to give
low priority to the use of the ME-262 as a jet fighter was both swift
and unsound. In the absence of any independent power base from
which his judgment could be challenged, the decision stood until
it was too late for a reversal to retrieve the fortunes of the German
Air Force
.
Under security policies of the Government a wide range of infor-
mation over which it has control is available only on a need to know basis.
4
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Such need in practice must be interpreted by thousands of individual cus-
todians of security information. The need to know has little to do with
a person's security clearance. A person can have a top secret clearance
and yet be refused access to documents because some functionary, who
is likely to be overcautious, judges that there is no need to know . This
can and does have ludicrous consequences, such as actual cases in which
persons have submitted reports to Government agencies and later have been
denied permission to reexamine them. In practice this sort of thing has
meant that information bearing on plans and capabilities of the national
endeavor has been given limited circulation.
It is not necessarily true, for example, that the less the Russians
know about American plans and capabilities the better it will be for the
national security. There are some things that the enemy needs to know if
security is to be successful, especially if the object is to convince Russia
that she cannot attack this country successfully, and that we in turn do not
intend to attack her.
The application of secrecy to operations of the stockpile since its
early beginnings has without doubt caused much of the difficulty that is
currently associated with the program. The public has been provided with
little knowledge concerning its existence and the purposes to which the
stockpile was dedicated. This has prevented the people from speaking out
in opposition to such things as changing objectives to promote post-Korean
War demand for domestic minerals with increasing expenditures in spite of
excesses on hand.
Harry H. Ransom, Can American Democracy Survive Cold War ?
,







There is little doubt that the inventories, stockage objectives for
most materials, and stockpile management information have remained
classified when the need for secrecy had long passed. There may be some
justification for classifying the stockage objective for materials short of
the objective, but the amount of a given material in the inventory at any
one time is a fact that can be easily determined by suppliers and by other
7
countries. Surely the public is entitled to know as much about the stock-
pile as do any special interest groups or foreign countries.
Above all, classification has provided the additional problem of try-
ing to conduct stockpile affairs on a business-like basis without, at the
same time, violating existing laws and regulations concerning the handling
of classified documents. To anyone who has worked under such conditions
the implications of doing business under such restraints is readily appreci-
ated.
Stockpile Materials and Their Stockage Objectives
There are two questions concerning stockpiling that should be kept
distinct and separate. One is what to stock, and the other is how much
to stock.
Determination of what to stock is based upon clear evidence that the
material in question is essential to wartime production, and unless antici-
patory action is taken would be in short supply during an all-out war. It
must also be demonstrated that stockpiling represents the most practical and
efficient means of meeting the indicated wartime deficit. In determining the
form and grade of materials to be stockpiled, a basic rule has been to stock-
pile material at the stage of processing where wartime deficits are likely
7




to occur. Consistent with this policy, the principles of maintaining
maximum flexibility for wartime use, minimum loss from obsolescence;
and lowest storage costs are involved. Thus, a number of metals and
minerals are stockpiled in the form of raw ore or concentrates , such as
manganese, chromium and tungsten. Others, such as copper, aluminum
and nickel, are stockpiled in pigs, ingot, or similar metallic forms. Occa-
sionally, security is the determining factor as to the form in which a ma-
terial will be stockpiled. Most are stockpiled, however, in the form most
o
easily and speedily utilized in the event of war.
A list of the materials held in the stockpile as of December 31, 1963,
is included as Table II on page 34.
Determination of how much to stock is provided by the use of a term
called the stockage objective. This is the quantity of a given material
required to be carried in the stockpile, determined by comparing require-
ments for the material with sources of supply for an estimated period of
time of national conflict. Expected sources of supply include domestic and
reasonably available foreign supplies considered in the light of possible,
enemy restrictions. Considering the purpose of stockpiling, this method
of computing a stockage objective appears to be correct and logical.
However, in 1954, in order to justify further purchases of lead and
zinc for the stockpile when use of the original method of computing the
stockage objective failed to provide a reason for additional buying, basic
assumptions were changed. Two objectives were then determined for each
item in the stockpile. A basic objective was computed as before, and a new
long-term objective, called the maximum objective, was computed by dis-
allowing all sources of supply from over-seas areas. This had the effect
of doubling the amount of certain materials carried in the stockpile.
o
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Vegetable Tannin Extract , Chestnut
Vegetable Tannin Extract, Quebracho
Vegetable Extract , Wattle
Zinc
Source: Statistical Supplement Stockpile Report to the Congress





Soon after, it was evident that even with the long-term maximum
stockage objective additional purchases of zinc and lead considered
desirable for reasons other than national security were not permissible
and the arbitrary 1 year rule was established. This gave the stockpiling
program three different stockage objectives depending upon how the need
was interpreted, The 1 year rule required the stockpile to carry sufficient
material of a strategic or critical nature to sustain the total peacetime
national economy during a normal year (also arbitrary)
.
This rule made
no mention of wartime requirements. The effect was to increase levels
of some materials in the stockpile once more.
Setting stockage objectives for materials to be stockpiled has a very
great impact upon the volume of material to be purchased by the Government
and the amount of money to be spent to make these purchases. It has an-
other important impact as well. It serves as the means for determining
whether the amount of material held in the stockpile for a specific material
is surplus to projected needs or whether the item is deficient. Thus, the
arbitrary nature of the stockage objective computation provides a convenient
vehicle for application of stockpile purchases or sales to any specific re-
quirement or strategy that might be advised.
The method used to compute stockage objectives is classified and
9
the principle of need to know is cited as the governing criterion. However,
it is known that a factoring formula is applied which discounts the normal
supply of material from a specific source. Three separate factors are em-
ployed; the first discounts the internal dependability of an exporting
country; the second discounts for the probability of shipping losses from
the exporting country; and, the third discount is based upon the relative
9
Letter from W. N. Lawrence, Office of Emergency Planning, to
LCDR D, B. Gordon, March 24, 1964.
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concentration of supply of a material in any one geographical area. Dis-
counts range from ten to one-hundred percent. In addition, discounts
applied to a specific country are the same for all materials exported by
that country. As an example, the normal expected supply of nickel from
Country X is 10 ,000 tons over a three year period. Discounting 15% for
internal dependability, 30% for shipping losses, and 20% for concen-
tration in that country's area produces a total discount of 65%. Thus 65%
of the 10 ,000 ton normal supply would be considered unavailable in time of
national crisis from Country X. Therefore, the stockpile would store as a
portion of its stockage objective 6,500 tons of nickel. The factoring system
is applied to all materials in the stockpile. How and by what computa-
tions the factor discounts are determined is classified information.
The determination of a stockage objective involved two areas of judg-
ment that have been particularly troublesome. First, there is a great deal
of leeway possible in appraising total emergency levels of supply for ma-
terials in the stockpile. For several years the practice was to favor a con-
servative approach, such as assuming reasonably normal flows of materials
from both domestic and foreign sources during conflict thereby creating a
lower stockage objective. The Department of the Interior, however, long
favored the assumption that all foreign supplies should be assumed to be
cut-off during a war, an assumption that led indirectly to the maximum or
long-range stockage objective. Secondly, there has always been uncertainty
as to the most desirable rates of acquisition of stockpile materials, even
though today the stockpile is considered to be at required strength for all
U.S. Cong., Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National
Stockpile and Naval Petroleum Reserves Subcommittee, Inquiry Into the
Strategic and Critical Material Stockpiles of the U.S . , Part 2, Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1963, p. 508.
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but three materials , chrysolite asbestos, small diamond dies and
jewel bearings. The extremes of political pressure under which stock-
age objectives have been determined since the stockpiling program began
have served to seriously undermine the development of stockage objec-
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IS STOCKPILING AN ANACHRONISM?
Disturbing criticism of the stockpiling program is heard from
many sources including those most concerned with the study of military
science and international affairs. The concern is not only with the mount-
ing cost of the program but with its usefulness as an element of national
security. In the ten years that followed enactment of the Stock Piling
Act in 19 46, two events, the development of nuclear weapons and the
emergence of Russia as a super-power, made reexamination of previously
sacred United States defense policies necessary. Henry A. Kissenger
has written:
Since World War I our strategic doctrine has always been built
around the proposition that our forces in being at the beginning
of a war need only be large enough to avoid disaster and that we
could then crush the enemy by mobilizing our industrial potential
after the outbreak of hostilities. The strategic significance of
our industrial potential has presupposed a fortuitous combination
of circumstances, however: our invulnerability to direct attack,
the existence of allies to hold a line while we were mobilizing,
and, above all, a certain stage of industrial and technological
development.
But nuclear weapons have cancelled the circumstance of invulner-
ability to direct attack; the NATO alliance is presumed to be incapable
of withstanding the power of the Soviets long enough for the United States
to rearm; and with our mobilization base vulnerable to destruction our
industrial and technological superiority becomes relatively unimportant
when compared with the need for forces in being at the time of attack.
Henry A. Kissenger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy , Harper
Brothers, New York, 1957, pp. 90-91.
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Charles J. Hitch, Comptroller of the Department of Defense, points out:
In an all-out thermonuclear war the superior economic war
potential of the United States is important only to the extent that
it has been effectively diverted to security purposes before war
starts. This is true for all forces, offensive or defensive
for preparedness for full thermonuclear war the United States must
leam to rely on forces in being, not as cadres about which much
larger, newly mobilized forces will be organized, but as the im-
portant forces . ^
Herman Kahn, a noted strategist and mathematician, notes that
"In an all-out nuclear war which would probably last less than 30 days,
and which perhaps might last only 30 minutes, there would hardly be time
3
for the operation of a post attack mobilization base."
An all-out nuclear war, however, is not the only or most likely
possibility. It would seem that we are probably subject to one of several
types of wars. It is not too difficult to imagine and describe six possible
types of war. These might be as follows:
1. Limited War in Europe. Hostilities would be confined to the
European area, nuclear weapons would not be used, and combat forces
would stabilize positions within a few months. This would be the
so-called World War II type of conflict, perhaps on a smaller scale.
2 . Korea -type War . Protracted fighting would be confined to
Southeast Asia or Korea, such as the Viet-Nam affair, against
organized combat forces of Red China or her satellites , and with
the U.S. having a secure position, initially, on the Asian continent.
2
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Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable , Horizon Press,
New York, 1962, p. 82.
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3 . Counterinsurgency Operations , Action would be taken
against subversive guerrilla units that seek to undermine local
national governments through raids , sabotage and infiltration
in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
4. Limited Sea War . Russia would attempt to blockade nations
friendly or allied with the U.S. with submarines in order to make
them accept certain political demands.
5* All -out War (Concluded
,
European Assistance Available.
Massive destruction would occur within the U. S. from nuclear
attack. There is an armistice in force and Europe, being un-
damaged, is able to assist in our recovery.
6* All-out War Continuing, European Assistance Unavailable .
Massive destruction would occur in the U. S, with broken-back .
operations continuing. Europe is occupied, blockaded or smashed.
It might appear that we are stockpiling the wrong commodities, some-
times in the wrong places, for presumably the wrong, or least likely war.
This does not mean, however, that the country should abandon the stock-
piling concept entirely. Considerations should be given to broad cate-
gories of materials that might reasonably be stockpiled against the kinds
of wars most likely to be fought. The basic thought should be one of
strategy rather than tactics as far as stockpiling is concerned. A class of
commodities that might have more value in a stockpile than those presently
carried are listed as follows:
1. Selected mineral ores (chromite, molybdenum, thorium, etc.)
2. Raw materials, other than mineral (hemp, silk, wool, etc.)
3. Primary food commodities (rice, wheat, sugar, etc.)
4
U. S. Cong., Senate, Committee on Armed Services , National Stock-
pile and Naval Petroleum Reserves Subcommittee, Inquiry Into the Strategic
and Critical Material Stockpiles of the U.S. , Part 9, Government Printing
Office, Washington, D. C, 1963, pp. 3149-3150.
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4. Medical supplies (anesthetics, dressings, antibiotics, etc.)
5. Machine tools (lathes, drills, presses, etc.)
6. Heavy removal equipment (mobile cranes, debris conveyers,
excavation equipment, etc.)
7. Construction materials and equipment (structural steel, pipe,
lumber, earthmovers
, etc.)
8. Processed foods (canned meats, milk powder, milled flour, etc.)






stoves, common hardware, winter clothing , etc.)





bullion at Fort Knox)
For either counterinsurgency operations or limited sea war, no significant
stockpiling beyond inventories held by the Armed Forces, industry and the
distribution pipeline appears necessary. For all-out war, raw materials
are of secondary importance since the primary need would be for finished
consumer goods. Heavy, mobile equipment would be needed to move debris
and reconstruction materials and should be stockpiled. In the event of
limited war normal sources of supply would in all probability remain avail-
able. Stockpiling does not seem justified under such conditions. Only in
the event of a repetition of a general war, such as World War II, does StOCk-
piling of selected minerals and raw materials seem valid.
What are the possibilities of any one of these wars occurring in the
years ahead? This is an extremely difficult question to answer. Dr. Bernard
Brodie of the Rand Corporation concluded that "where the object is to pre-










until all the relevant facts are in." He also pointed out that "wars are
7
the graveyards of the predictions concerning them."
In the face of such advice it seems safe to conclude that as long
as the United States and Russia maintain a nuclear stalemate neither
will deliberately choose to attack the other in an all-out nuclear war,
except in desperation. This reduces the danger of such a war although
accidents, miscalculations or actions by other nations could easily upset
such a theory. It also seems that the Communists will minimize the risk
of starting an all-out war and will use limited military force as the means
of achieving their objectives, and when that is not possible cold war
o
tactics will be pressed. "A candid view of the nature of the contempo-
rary struggle for power compels one to recognize that the Communist ap-
proach to war is as compatible with the imperatives of cold war and
9
limited war as the traditional American approach is incompatible." Finally,
it seems safe to assume that a World War II type of conflict, the one that
justifies the stockpile's existence more than any other, is least likely to
occur. In the event of complete atomic disarmament this type of war would
assume a greater probability of occurrence.
Thus, commodities stockpiled against a World War II type of conflict,
the only one for which stockpiling in its present form could be termed es-
sential, might conceivably be set at a one year supply of incremental needs.
A comparison of suggested stockpile requirements as previously cited is
matched with the six potential types of war in Table III on page 43
.
7
Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age , Princeton University
Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1959, pp. 406-407.
o
Robert E. Osgood, Limited War, The University of Chicago Press,









































1. Selected mineral ores
and metals # % /o
2. Raw materials -other
than mineral # % /o
3 . Primary food
commodities /o
4. Medical
supplies % # #
5 , Machine
tools % # #
6 # Heavy removal
equipment # #
7 . Construction materials &
equipment # #
8. Processed foods # #





11. Gold # /o
Code: # (Should be stockpiled); (Should not be stockpiled); % (maybe)
Source: Inquiry Into the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiles
of the U.S. (Washington: National Stockpile and Naval Petroleum Reserves




THE PROBLEM OF EXCESSES
Perhaps the most significant problem facing stockpile management
is that of disposition of materials in the stockpile that are in excess of
requirements
. This problem is by no means small . As of December 31
,
1963, the value of materials in excess of stockpile stockage objectives
exceeded $5 billion. If a decision were made to reduce the stockpile
inventory to a one year supply of incremental materials
,
as was dis-
cussed in the preceding chapter, the excess value would be considerably
greater.
The problem is intensified because of the effects upon domestic
mining and foreign policy interests that wholesale disposal of stockpile
materials has upon prices in world and domestic markets. Both U.S.
mining interests and countries whose economies are tied to one product
mineral exports strongly oppose any disposal attempts that exceed token
dribbles
.
Senator Wallace F. Bennett of Utah, testifying before the Symington
Subcommittee, related:
Back in 19 59, the Office of Defense Mobilization merely an-
nounced that it was considering the sale of 128,000 tons of copper
from the stockpile. As this information leaked to the public two
news stories appeared in the Daily Metal Reporter entitled "Govern-
ment Penny-Wise, Pound Foolish Copper Policy" and "Copper Markets
Weakened By Government Disposal Talk." These stories showed that




the price of copper dropped in the London market in 7 days
by 2 . 62 cents a pound while the domestic market price dropped
2 cents a pound in the same period.
It should be observed, however, that these interests have had
less to fear from sales of excesses than might be expected. No portion
of the Stock Piling Act of 1946 received more intensive attention from
the lawmakers than did the means for disposing of materials from the
stockpile. Congress apparently considered the matter to be of primary
importance and retained firm control over any proposed sales. This was
done by permitting disposal only with the "express approval of Congress"
,
and then only after a six months delay. During the 1946 Congressional
hearings on the Stock Piling Act, the mining industry pointed out em-
phatically the potential danger of large accumulations of metals and miner-
als in Government hands with their overhanging effect upon private mining
interests. They successfully argued for adequate safeguards against dis-
posal to the extent that, as Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado phrased
3
it, "the stockpiles were locked up and Congress kept the key."
For a number of reasons Congress has been reluctant to approve
more than token sales of materials from the stockpile. Congressmen from
mineral producing states express concern over dumping possibilities. There-
fore, the law provides a number of safeguards against hasty disposal action.
Announcement of a proposed sale must be published in the Federal Register
for at least six months prior to the date of intended disposal action. In
addition, sales from either the National Stockpile or the Supplemental
2U.S. Cong. , Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National
Stockpile and Naval Petroleum Reserves Subcommittee, Inquiry Into the
Strategic and Critical Material Stockpiles of the U.S .
,
Part 5, Govern-





Stockpile must, as was mentioned, have express Congressional ap-
proval. Until 19 62, the Departments of Agriculture , Commerce, Defense,
State and the Interior were in a position to veto any stockpile disposal
plans. This was often done to protect some interest vital to that depart-
ment's business. This restriction was removed to some degree by De-
4
fense Mobilization Order V-7 which was republished on April 25, 1962.
Foreign policy considerations often stand in the way of disposal
action of certain materials. For example, the State Department opposed
sale of natural rubber from the stockpile on the grounds that market prices
might drop so sharply as to disrupt the economies of Malaya and other
sources of rubber in Southeast Asia. It objected, as well, to disposal of
quartz crystals even though there has long since been developed a super-
ior synthetic. Brazil had been the primary source of these crystals and
sales from the stockpile might have seriously damaged an already shaky
Brazilian economy.
The ultimate responsibility for disposal action rests with the Office
of Emergency Planning which in turn directs the General Services Adminis-
tration to prepare necessary disposal plans. These plans usually set
forth a description of the material, amount of material for disposal, the
manner of disposal with particular emphasis on the length of time over
which substantial amounts of materials will be sold and terms for the sale.
A notice is then published in the Federal Register and the long six months'
wait begins
.
Attempts to dispose of excesses have been ineffectual, although the
Office of Emergency Planning is having better success of late. There have
4
Richard L. Worsnop, "Government Stockpiling , " Editorial Research
Reports
, Vol. II, No. 8, August 22, 19 62, Washington, D.C., pp. 630-631
Inquiry, Draft Report, op_. cit. , p. 28.
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been good sized disposals of natural rubber, tin and aluminum in the
U.S. in the last two years. Significantly, there are no producers of
these materials in this country, which could well account for the fact
that they have received the necessary sanctions from Congress for their
disposal. Plans were recently announced for long range (over 6 to 8
years) disposal of 127,000 tons of surplus tin from the stockpile. It is
noteworthy, however, that 98,000 tons of this amount have not received
Congressional authorization for disposal to date.
Much has been written and more has been said about the disposal
function in stockpiling. Senate Bill, S.2272, submitted by Symington
Subcommittee makes a stab at improving the disposal machinery by short-
ening the waiting period from 6 months to 60 days. But, Congressional
control over disposal remains
,
and this is short of the type of improvement
that is needed to give stockpile management an even chance to handle
adequately this problem.





The absolute growth in expenditures for Government services and
functions of all kinds have stimulated appraisal of how these operations
are managed and to what uses the public's money is being put. The appli-
cation of national resources by the Government toward public objectives
has made it imperative that efficiency be obtained in order to derive maxi-
mum benefit from their use.
To accomplish a specified level of operational efficiency the pre-
ferred method will be that which involves the least cost in the form of
claims on resources having valuable alternative uses. Alternatively, if
resource use is limited by budget constraints, then the preferred method
is the one that yields the greatest effectiveness for the funds budgeted.
Whichever the constraint, a given effectiveness or a given budget, the
issue is the same. The preferred activity is the efficient or economical
one in which resources cannot be employed for one use without removing
them from another use.
There is something to be gained from establishing decision making
machinery in Government operations such that operating decisions are
made according to the merits of the uses of a given set of resources
.
Efficiency would then depend upon the degree of economic responsibility
achieved in selecting among alternative ways of carrying out the operation
Norman V. Breckner, "Government Efficiency and the Military Buyer-
Seller Device," Journal of Political Economy , Vol. LXVIII, No. 5, October,
19 60, University of Chicago Press , Chicago, p. 469.
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One means for achieving such a result in Government is the buyer-
seller device, This is a refined approach to the Lemer Proposal of World
War II fame which proposed for the military services establishment of a
market operating on a decentralized decision making basis much as the
private sector of the economy does
. The laws of supply and demand would
control military spending and resource usage such that efficiency of opera-
tion would be rewarded by a greater return on dollars spent to achieve a
2
specific goal or objective. The buyer-seller device attempts to impose
upon the Government agency the type of coordination and constraint that
3
controls existence in the market of the private economy.
One approach used by the Government to establish the buyer-seller
device has been the revolving fund of which military stock funds and in-
dustrial funds are examples. The following definition is quoted:
A revolving funds is a fund established to finance a cycle of
operations to which reimbursements and collections are returned
for reuse in a manner such as will maintain the principal of the
fund.4
Congress, in the past, has established a number of special re-
volving funds designed to improve and give more flexibility to certain types
of Government operations . There have been numerous proposals to extend
this type of financial operation to other agencies . The Bureau of the Budget
has favored use of revolving funds because they permit more informed budget
and fiscal action, and provide for systematic presentation of business-type
budget information by the agency concerned
.
2
Charles J. Hitch , op. cit. , p. 222.
3Norman V. Breckner, op. cit. , p. 470.
4
U. S. Dept. of the Navy, Navy Comptroller Manual , Vol. 1,
Appendix A, Glossary of Terms , p.A-16.
U. S. Cong., Senate, Committee on Govt. Operations , Financial




President Eisenhower, in his budget message to Congress for Fiscal
Year, 1961, said:
Major business-type activities of the Government should, with
few exceptions, operate on a self-sustaining basis. Their budgets
and accounts should permit ready comparison with their expenses
and revenues. They should have simplicity in their financing struc-
ture and flexibility in expenditures necessary to meet unforeseen
business conditions
. . . .through revolving funds."
Adaptation of the revolving fund method of financial management
to public enterprise has several advantages:
1. It provides a clear presentation of profit or loss by bringing the
expenses and revenues of the operation into close relationship. Business-
type budgeting and reporting utilizing balance sheets are automatically
employed. Congress can more readily determine the extent to which it may
wish to draw upon public taxation to finance the operation. In contrast,
traditional methods of appropriation financing tend to obscure rather than
disclose significant facts about the enterprise.
2. It provides simplicity in the financing and funding structure. In
lieu of many separate pockets for the deposit of receipts, revolving funds
permit organization receipts to be placed in one fund which is available for
the expenses and capital outlays of the enterprise. Multiplicity of account-
ing pockets for receipts creates unnecessary work and contributes to dif-
ficulty in understanding the financial impact of the operation.
3. Flexibility of operation is improved within budget controls set
by Congress. While a revolving fund must necessarily keep within the
capital Congress provides for it plus any profits generated, it is customary
for Congress to provide a higher degree of flexibility to meet unforeseen





4. They provide more incentive for effective management of revenue
than when receipts are placed directly in the general fund of the Treasury.
This is particularly true where the revolving fund is designed to be self-
sustaining
.
5. It removes the potential for distortion and inflation of infor-
mation gathered from budget receipt and expenditure totals. Revolving fund
expenditures are stated on a net basis in budget totals
,
reflecting charges
that must be paid by the taxpayer. Without a revolving fund the same activi-
ties are counted on a gross basis in budget totals even where expenditures
7
match user charges in the budget receipt figures.
Finally, the second Hoover Commission recommended further exami-
nation of the application of revolving funds to Government operations
. In
addition, it recommended that controller type organizations be established in
the principal agencies of the executive branch to improve their financial
• * 8organization.
Returning to the stockpile program, it is suspected that financial
management of stockpile operations can be measurably improved by use of
the revolving fund concept. Although the scope of the stockpile program
exceeds that normally associated with agencies who employ revolving funds,
it is believed that careful adaptation of this principle can prove to be ex-
tremely beneficial. Three types of improvement are envisioned:
1, Stockpile management should be motivated to conduct stockpile











effectiveness in terms of profit or loss generated by stockpile activities.
This would provide a bench mark, for accolades or criticism by Congres-
sional authorities and politicians
.
2. A more effective effort to dispose of surpluses could be pursued,.
Applying the principles of product diversification, in a broad sense, sales
would be perpetuated in such a way as to provide stockpile revenue from
which stockpile expenses would be paid. Management would be motivated
to find more ways to utilize excesses and to reduce costs in order to regis-
ter as much profit as possible . When profits reach certain levels the
Treasury would siphon off funds for return to general use.
3, Stockpile output would be allocated more effectively, or put to
its most valuable uses, because of the market mechanism which would dic-
tate the most efficient utilization of stockpile assets
.
The market mecha-
nism or the buyer-seller device , of course is perpetuated by the revolving
fund.
Management of the stockpile under the revolving fund offers a per-
vasive and competitive mechanism for promoting efficient management
methods. In addition, it offers the best hope for escaping from beneath
legislative constraints and bureaucratic regulation which rob Government
agencies of the flexibility needed to take advantage of the evolutionary
aspects of our economy.
As was pointed out earlier there is a definite division of management
responsibility for the stockpile between the Office of Emergency Planning
and the General Services Administration, as well as other interested agen-
cies. This is a constant source of frustration when timely action is needed
to conduct affairs effectively. In addition, the Inderdepartmental Materials
9
Charles J. Hitch, op. cit. , p. 225
52

Advisory Committee acts as a restraining influence on activities contem-
plated by stockpile management. And, Congress still maintains stringent
control over appropriations and disposal activities,
A sound and practical organization is needed for stockpile manage-
ment. It should be designed to perform all functions of stockpiling in order
to achieve the desired return on the nation's investment.
To provide the type of organization suggested, it would probably be
necessary for Congress to establish by law a single authority much like the
Commodity Credit Corporation, for example, A complete range of activity
needed to pursue effectively a flexible stockpiling policy should be estab-
lished under this organization. Congress, the National Security Council,
and/or the IMAC might become the board of directors and pass judgment
upon, as well as recommend, stockpiling policies. But, this agency would
retain responsibility for all decisions made in order to best perpetuate the
stockpile. There would be an inherent capability for selecting from alterna-
tive solutions to basic stockpiling problems.
The search for alternative solutions becomes a basic step in the entire
management process. The elements of stockpiling operation must be re-
shuffled and whole new alternatives created. Should the stockpile be
maintained for national defense only? Does civil defense have any claim
on the use of stockpile assets? Should market prices for minerals and metals
be stabilized through the use of stockpile assets? Should stockpiling be
abandoned entirely and these assets be treated as a sunk cost? Questions
such as these constitute a search for alternative uses for stockpile assets.
In addition, alternatives rejected at one point in time can be readily examined
W. Warren Haynes and Joseph L, Massie, Management , Prentice-
Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs , N.J., 19 61, p. 150,
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and accepted at another should conditions warrant. Flexibility to adapt
to the needs of the times would establish the stockpile as a self-sustain-
ing entity to which much good can accrue.
Reorganization of stockpile management to adapt the stockpile to
revenue generating activities also provides questions concerning costs.
One basic objective would be to reduce costs to the minimum level needed
to properly conduct operations. Because the stockpile is well above its
computed strength and disposal activity is so time consuming and unpro-
ductive under current laws
,
the reduction or elimination of avoidable
costs is a matter of prime importance. The revolving fund should measur-
ably aid in promoting this objective.
Typical costs generated by the existence of the stockpile are sum-
marized as follows:
1. Carrying costs . The cost of capital tied up in inventory plus
handling, obsolescence, spoilage, etc.
2. Interest costs . The cost of money borrowed by the Government
to procure and maintain the stockpile. It is sometimes considered as part
of the carrying costs,
3. Cost of shortages . This is not significant under current inter-
national conditions and due to the size of the stockpile. But, should the
need develop the shortage cost would be directly proportional to the urgency
of the need. Presumably, a reorganized stockpile organization would at-
tempt to project the need for new materials for stockpiling and undertake
advanced action to minimize this cost.
4. Opportunity costs
.
These costs would have to be considered
under present laws and regulations controlling stockpile assets. The funds




5- Costs of operations , These would include the costs of doing
stockpile business such as adding new materials, conversions of ma-
terials into more useful forms
,
upgrading and concentration of ores , stock
rotation, and actual agency operational costs. It may even be within the
capability of a reorganized stockpiling agency to pay its own personnel
salaries and administrative costs from revenues generated under the re-
volving fund.
Evaluation of these costs is not an easy matter. For one thing, many
do not appear on the accounting records and consequently they must be de-
veloped. In many cases they are difficult to isolate, For example, efforts
to isolate fixed and variable costs for an activity of the magnitude of
stockpiling would probably be an extensive operation. But in the final analy-
sis, success under a revolving fund plan of financial management rests on
the control of costs ,
The answer to the question "Why control?" specifies the objectives
of an inventory control policy in the narrow sense, and an overall stockpile
control policy in the broad sense. Since costs permeate most businesses and
because success in business depends largely upon the ability to control them,
12
the primary objective most often will involve cost control. This statement
of course would be subject to whatever policies the stockpile might be oper-
ating under where factors other than costs become more critical to the analy-
sis o
Thus, reorganization of the stockpiling program under a single respon-
sible agency utilizing a revolving fund concept to help achieve efficient
administration appears to be desirable. It would be in keeping with the
James I. Morgan, "Questions for Solving the Inventory Problem,"
Harvard Business Review , Vol, 41, No, 4, July-August, 19 63, Harvard





wishes of the taxpayers to aid in reducing Government waste and costs.
To accomplish this task, basic principles of good management con-
trol are necessary. This is not to say that such controls do not exist under
the present organizational structure for the stockpiling program. It does
say, however, that the concept of management control can be an effective
tool for accomplishing the changes discussed so far.
The basic philosophy behind such a system is that timely action is
stimulated as the result of observations that constantly compare progress
with approved plans . Corrections are made at the time the need develops
,
hopefully reducing costs and administrative fire-fighting. Because of its
association with the records of the activity, the controller function is best
suited to adapt an effective management control system to the organization.
In so doing controllership becomes the right arm of top management in the
13
operation of the organization.
Good controllership utilizing a sound management control system can
do the following things for a new stockpiling organization:
1. It can control stockpile operations through an integrated plan
which would provide cost standards, expense budgets, sales forecasts,
revenue planning, and necessary financing.
2 . It will measure stockpile performance against approved plans and
standards through the design of necessary systems, records, accounting
policies and statistics.
3. Controllership will measure and report on the validity of stock-
piling goals, as well as the effectiveness of policies, organization, and
procedures used.
4. It can supervise all matters relating to reports to the executive
and legislative branches of Government, as well as to interested private
Edward C.Schleh, "Stimulating Action Through Management Control,
The Controller, Vol. 40, No. 12, December, 19 60, p. 573.
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groups and organizations to whom stockpiling is an important subject.
5. It will interpret and report on the effect of external influences
on the attainment of stockpile objectives. This would include continuous
appraisal of economic and social forces both within and without the Govern-
ment that influence or affect stockpiling.
6. Finally, controllership will protect stockpile assets, a tremen-
dous task in view of the financial magnitude of the inventories involved.
This would include establishment of adequate internal controls , audits
,
and coverage. It would work closely with the General Accounting Office
in the area of internal review to assure efficient management and elimi-
14
nation of waste.
The General Services Administration provides the controllership func-
tion under the present organization. The functions outlined above are un-
doubtedly practiced to some extent. But, the fact remains that GSA applies
these functions to all programs over which it has supervision and stockpile
operations is just one of these. This makes it difficult to apply sole and
specific direction to stockpile management by the controller, or any manage-
ment official, in the same sense that an independent stockpile agency would
apply this direction since stockpiling would be its only interest.
The stockpile controller would be able to install a financial manage-
ment plan to provide management with proper information for top-level
decision making. The plan recommended is termed a programming system
and would operate in conjunction with the revolving fund concept already
described. It is similar in nature to the Department of Defense System.
Reduced to simple terms, the programming system consists of a five year
14
David R. Anderson and Leo A. Schmidt, Practica l Controllership
,
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Homewood, Illinois, 1951, p. 11.
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•
projection of all stockpile activities expressed in physical, or basic-
ally non-financial terms
,
together with their costs and a set of regular
procedures for modifying the plan in the face of necessary changes.
The key to a stockpile programming system would be decision making
by program elements and major programs. A program element may consist
of disposal action on a single commodity such as natural rubber; major
programs might be concerned with adapting portions of the stockpile to
Civil Defense. Major programs would be isolated upon reorganization and
divided into applicable program elements all subject to change as conditions
might warrant.
The program element includes costs and benefits that accrue to it.
Benefits will be measured by the ways in which the element helps to
achieve broad stockpile goals. Costs will be those required to execute the
element.
The programming system will make it possible to unify program de-
cisions and budget decisions. During the annual budget review the approved
five year plan would be translated into detailed cost estimates. By com-
parison of revenue expectations with costs an annual surplus or deficit can
be predicted. If serious deficits are anticipated under the revolving fund,
then relief by appropriation may be requested from Congress.
The programming system should free the stockpiling agency to look
systematically at stockpile plans and programs for period of time in excess
of one year. It provides a major tool for use by top management to actively
and effectively promote stockpiling policies , whatever they may turn out
to be.
Allen C. Enthoven, " Economic Analysis in the Department of Defense,"
American Economic Review, Vol. LIII, No. 2, May 1963, pp. 414-417.
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Finally, it should be pointed out that many features of scientific
inventory management can be applied to stockpiling operations. Economic
analysis, statistical analysis, operations analysis, etc, , may all have
applications toward solving stockpiling problems . These techniques un-
doubtedly receive more than passing attention from the present stockpile
management team. But, again, the agencies presently managing the stock-
pile have other duties as well. In the final analysis, an optimum program
should develop through an agency devoted specifically to stockpile manage-
ment. The worth of this program will be measured in dollars for all practical
purposes in the years to come unless a national holocaust develops sud-
denly. The function of controllership may thereby prove to be the strength
or failure of future attempts to resurrect the stockpile from the throes of





It seems clear that from the standpoint of national security much
of the present stockpile of strategic and critical materials is no longer
required. However, there is much that can be done toward adapting the
assets of the stockpile to a multitude of uses that befit the circumstances
of the times. It appears that the stockpile can serve many different pur-
poses at the same time. Assets valued at almost $9 billion do not have
to be applied to only one specific objective. Therefore, reconstitution
of the stockpile to suit modern assumptions of national strategy and the
public welfare should be a matter of utmost concern to the Government and
the public, Clarence Randall, former Governor of Massachusetts, ob-
served that "the problems of Government are too complex and the policies
of Government too close today to be dealt with successfully by ignoring
them."
1
The utility of the stockpile has been eroded by enormous changes
in the art of warfare in the years since World War II, During this period of
extensive change, stockpile planning has apparently remained inert. There
are those who would take steps to prohibit even cautious and orderly dis-
posal of stockpile excesses created as the result of changing concepts
and technology. Such people deprive the nation of use of funds tied up in
stockpiles that might be used for more worthy purposes . There are others
who believe that stockpiling is completely outmoded and that steps must be
Robert F. Lenhart and Karl Schriftgiesser, "Management in Politics,"
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 319,
September, 1958, p. 36.
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taken to convert these assets to other uses. Such people believe that
the only war likely to be fought by this country will be nuclear in charac-
ter, thereby reducing the value of a pre-attack mobilization base to practi-
cal insignificance.
Although the answer to these extremes of thought lies somewhere
in between, it seems certain that the latter viewpoint is more near the
truth than not. Therefore, considerable effort should be applied toward
determining uses for stockpile assets as a post attack recovery aid. Raw
materials would not necessarily be needed, but finished goods and struc-
tural facilities can be created from these assets for a new form of stock-
piling .
Being stockpiled for a crash civil defense program might make
an enormous difference, both in our ability to meet civil defense in a
hurry and our ability to do it in an orderly way rather than in panic
when people start looking for gunny sacks, shovels and everything
else.
^
Civil defense is but one of many uses to which stockpile assets
might be put. Foreign aid, foreign policy, market stabilization, cartel
busting, and undoubtedly many more uses may provide a profitable use for
3
these assets. It would appear that man's ingenuity is the limiting factor.
Although the stockpile was created as a national security measure, the
country should be mature enough to see that it has outgrown this use and
that a practical approach to the use of the stockpile must be developed,
sooner or later.
2
Inquiry, Draft Report, op. pit. , p. 106.
3Use of stockpile assets in areas such as foreign aid, foreign
policy, market stabilization, etc. , assumes recognition of the fact that
these uses are subject to those constraints inherent with each operation.
It was not intended to develop solutions to these problems in this paper,
but their existence cannot be ignored.
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It is not inconceivable that a greater threat to the nation exists
by ignoring Government programs and activities that divert our country's
resources into inefficient uses. There can be danger to our national future
if programs such as stockpiling are permitted to remain as part of national
planning when they fail to contribute any significant value. Stockpiling
should conform to planning that best suits national growth and security
for the years ahead.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are suggested as a means for es-
tablishing a progressive approach to optimum utilization of the stockpile:
1. Legislation should be enacted to consolidate all inventories of
strategic and critical materials into one inventory. This inventory might
properly be called the National Stockpile. It should be subdivided into
two parts. One part would consist of at most a one year supply of incre-
mental strategic and critical materials needed in the event of limited or
conventional types of war. This part would be subject to change with
materials moving to the second part as conditions change. The second
part would consist of the balance of the stockpile and would be termed
operating stock. The one year supply would be reserved for war or other
national emergencies and would change with strategy and technology.
Operating stock would be utilized by stockpile management for needs
deemed best for the Government and the public, and would serve to gener-
ate operating revenue.
2. Legislation should establish a separate, singularly responsible
stockpile agency to manage all phases of the stockpiling program. This
agency should be far enough removed from political restraints and private
interest group pressure to permit relatively unrestricted operation within





3 . The agency under which the stockpile is to be managed should
utilize the revolving fund for its financial operation. The trend in Govern-
ment is toward adaptation of revolving funds to as many agencies as can
be practically managed in this way. With so much value at stake it is
imperative that the best possible tools be provided to stockpile manage-
ment to perform the job required.
4. Basic principles of management control through strong controller-
ship must permeate the new stockpile organization. In this way the organi-
zation will be capable of controlling costs more effectively, and costs
are of prime importance in achieving efficient administration.
5. A programming system of financial management should be adopted
through the controller function to provide a proper basis for decision mak-
ing . This system should establish a long-range financial plan, preferably
for the ensuing five years , to provide direction for stockpile activities in
the years ahead.
6. All stockpile operations should be declassified and made part
of the public record. This would permit more intelligent evaluation of
stockpile policies by interested groups and agencies for preparation of
their own plans . There appears to be no great harm to our national security
from disclosure of such knowledge to the public. On the contrary, some
good may accrue from reexamination of stockpile activities by public ex-
posure and debate.
7 . Scientific management and inventory control techniques should
be applied to all possible areas of stockpile operation. Specific studies
toward providing better management tools would be invaluable in the long
run.
8. An extensive search for uses to which stockpile assets can be
applied, both within the Government and the private economy, should be
initiated with, perhaps, particular emphasis on civil defense applications.




9, Disposal of stockpile excesses should be freed from Con-
gressional control to the greatest extent possible under the law. Al-
though there is much in favor of Congress exercising a certain degree
of control over disposal of these materials, it is certain that no ef-
ficient program can be developed if one hand is tied behind the agency's
back. Disposal activity would be the heart of revenue production under
the revolving fund. It must be left to wise and enlightened management
of stockpile operations by the agency to be cognizant of national or
international implications of projected disposal planning. Again, the
interests of the American public should be the decisive factor in making
these decisions
.
In conclusion, the following editorial printed in The Wall Street
Journal described the stockpiling situation as it now stands:
Two years ago President Kennedy expressed concern over the
size of the defense materials stockpile and asked Congress for
recommendations for orderly disposal of surplus items. Since
then the situation has grown worse.
It's true that Congress held hearings. But about all they pro-
duced were highly partisan charges that politicians and planners
in the past had generally made a mess of things. Along with dire
warnings that disposal of the surplus could cause all sorts of dis-
ruptions
.
Meanwhile, the total value of the pile of metals, fibers
and other materials in the past 12 months has edged upward by
$100 million as purchases under long-standing contracts have
more than offset skimpy sales. The surplus portion of the total
has grown even more, rising by $1.1 billion to a total of $4.5
billion, as planners continually scale down estimates of needs
.
Moreover, of course, the cost of storing all the unneeded
stuff is steadily mounting. Also growing are the opportunities for
future political infighting and maneuvering, as well as the risks
that any eventual cut in the Federal horde will really damage
private markets for the materials involved.
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So, it's worth noting that a Senate subcommittee has at
last voted a plan to speed up disposal. At present Congress
must approve each sale from the stockpile. The subcommittee
proposed instead that the President be authorized to sell any
items 100 days after giving notice to Congress, if neither the
House or the Senate objects. This may not be the best answer,
but the present system is no answer at all.
It may well be that the problem has been allowed to grow
so large that it is no longer susceptible to painless solution.
But to do nothing makes as much sense as refusing to bail out of
a leaky boat for fear of slipping over the side. 4
4
Editorial in The Wall Street Journal
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